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FREEDOM OF DISCRIMINATION?: THE
CONFLICT BETWEEN PUBLIC
ACCOMMODATIONS' FREEDOM OF
ASSOCIATION AND STATE ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAWS
GREGORY J. WARTMAN*

"Discrimination threatens not only the rights and proper
privileges of the inhabitants of [New Jersey,] but menaces the
institutions and foundation of a free democratic State."1 This
declaration by the New Jersey state legislature sets forth the
strong policy underlying the state's Law Against Discrimination,
which prohibits discrimination against homosexuals and other
minorities in public accommodations.2
State legislatures
throughout the country have taken similar steps in this direction
by enacting comparable anti-discrimination statutes needed to end
discrimination in these organizations. As states have expanded
their civil rights laws in this fashion, conflicts have arisen between
individuals in a protected class and members of organizations
asserting their constitutionally protected freedom of association.
With the formation of new organizations each day expressing
opinions on a variety of issues, such conflicts are likely to increase
over the next several years. The importance of these competing
rights and policy interests demands that the United States
Supreme Court and legal scholars re-evaluate the proper scope of
the freedom of association, and develop a legal test that reflects
the boundaries of this constitutional right.
The 2000 case, Boy Scouts of America v. Dale,' provided the
Supreme Court with an ideal opportunity to re-examine the
interaction between the free association rights of public
accommodations
and
state
anti-discrimination
laws.
Unfortunately, the Court failed to revise its analysis to carefully
delineate the scope of this constitutional freedom. Instead, the

* Associate, Saul Ewing LLP, 2002-present; Law Clerk, Judge Peter Paul
Olszewski, Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 2001-2002; J.D., University of
Pittsburgh School of Law, Order of the Coif, 2001; B.A., University of
Delaware, magna cum laude, 1998.
1. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-3 (West 2000).
2. Id. §§ 10:5-1 to 5-49.
3. 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
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Court adopted a, myopic approach that protected the Boy Scouts'
right to remove a homosexual man from its organization without
adequate consideration of why it dismissed him and whether his
inclusion "significantly burdened" the group's ability to express its
message.
This article will discuss how the Supreme Court's analysis of
an organization's freedom of expressive association unnecessarily
impedes a state's right to legislate against discrimination. The
difficulty with the Court's overly broad interpretation of the
freedom of association becomes evident upon analyzing its decision
in Dale. This Article will propose modifying this analysis to place
greater emphasis on the organization's reasons for excluding an
individual. Such an inquiry will address whether the individual's
exclusion was based on his speech or his status as a homosexual,
and whether that speech or status expressed a viewpoint for
purposes of freedom of speech under the First Amendment. By
requiring the individual's dismissal to be based on his professed
views, the Court would help ensure that an organization's freedom
of association remains within its intended constitutional scope. In
addition, this doctrinal change would give greater effect to state
anti-discrimination statutes, which represent the will of a state's
citizens.
Section I of this Article will analyze how the freedom of
expressive association developed from an abstract principle within
the First Amendment to an enforceable legal right, and how this
right has been applied to challenge state anti-discrimination laws.
Early cases first recognized this freedom as necessary to protect
intimate associations between relatively few numbers of people.
More recent United States Supreme Court decisions recognize the
right of an organization to exclude individuals who express views
that conflict with the organization's message. These cases arise
when organizations claim that the freedom to associate shields
their membership decisions from the application of state
legislation prohibiting discrimination. This section will examine
several of these cases to illustrate how the Supreme Court has
defined this freedom and when, under that approach, a statute
violates an organization's Constitutional rights.
Section II will discuss the facts and legal issues presented in
Dale5 . In order to fully understand these legal issues and the need
for modification of the Supreme Court's constitutional doctrine, it
is helpful to examine how the New Jersey appellate courts and the
United States Supreme Court applied the freedom of association in
this case.
The Supreme Court held that the Boy Scouts
maintained a position against homosexuality, and that keeping

4. Id. at 659.
5. 530 U.S. 640.
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Dale as a member would significantly infringe on its freedom to
express this view.6 The Court's analysis of this issue did not
adequately consider whether the Boy Scouts dismissed Dale for his
viewpoint speech or his status. Justice Handler of the New Jersey
Supreme Court first discussed the importance of this distinction in
his concurring opinion,7 but as Professor Nan Hunter correctly
points out, he characterizes one's status too narrowly.8 This
distinction is essential in conducting a thorough inquiry into the
question of whether compelling the Boy Scouts to reinstate Dale
would "significantly infringe" the organization's ability to express
its views. The failure to consider this issue contributed to the
Court's unnecessary broadening of the scope of the freedom of
association.
Section III will propose a speech-status framework which
would require the Court to thoroughly analyze the reasons an
individual is excluded or removed from a public accommodation
and whether including that individual would constitute a severe
intrusion on the organization's freedom of expressive association.
This analytical framework recognizes that there are two general
situations where compelling an organization to include an
individual will "significantly burden" its ability to freely express
its views. The first situation centers around statements the
individual made that allegedly contradict the group's message.
The second focuses on the individual's identity or status which was
itself alleged to burden the organization's views. Subsection A will
analyze speech and status-based exclusions and will set forth five
specific categories into which an individual's speech or status may
fall depending on whether it expresses a viewpoint, identity, or
both. Examining these categories in the context of reviewing the
decision to exclude an individual will allow the Court to more
deftly determine whether the individual's statements or status
would significantly infringe upon the organization's freedom to
express its views.
As a result, this speech-status dichotomy will also bring the
application of the freedom of association in line with its intended
scope. Subsection B will discuss the proper protection that the
freedom of association was intended to offer and explain why the
Court must avoid extending this freedom beyond the interests it
was designed to protect. The freedom of association was not
intended to apply as a right in itself, but as a necessary means of
protecting other important interests, especially those embodied in
6. Id. at 659.
7. Dale v. Boy Scouts of America, 734 A.2d 1196, 1235-36 (N.J. 1999).
8. See Nan D. Hunter, Expressive Identity: Recuperating Dissent for
Equality, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. 1, 28 (2000) (arguing that Justice Handler's
view of self-identifying speech as nothing more than a label does not consider
that such speech also inherently conveys a sense of self-worth).
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the First Amendment. Clarifying the inquiry into whether an
individual's
speech or status significantly burdens
an
organization's freedom of expressive association will ensure the
likelihood that the Court protects organizations only to this extent
and does not unnecessarily usurp States' power to prohibit
discrimination.
Section IV will return to Dale9 and apply this speech-status
framework to the alleged conflict between the Boy Scouts' freedom
of association and New Jersey's interest in preventing
discrimination in its public accommodations. This reexamination
will show that Dale did not likely express a view on
homosexuality, and as a result, compelling the Boy Scouts to
reinstate him would not implicate the group's free speech rights.
Therefore, application of the New Jersey law would not
"significantly burden" the Scouts' ability to express its views. The
Boy Scouts' exclusion of Dale centered primarily on his identity,
and such status-based discrimination does not come within the
scope of the freedom of association and should not receive
constitutional protection from state regulation.
The courageous step forward many states have taken by
passing anti-discrimination laws demands that the United States
Supreme Court reexamine its current analysis of the conflict
between this legislation and the freedom of expressive association
of organizations. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court failed to do so
when it was last presented with the opportunity in the spring of
2000, and few commentators have addressed this specific problem.
This Article sets forth a speech-status framework that would help
the Court analyze whether a state's anti-discrimination statute
"significantly infringes" upon an organization's freedom of
association. This proposal would help district and appellate courts
properly define the scope of the freedom of association and
harmonize the associational rights of organizations with States'
efforts to end discrimination.
I.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND THE
SUPREME COURT'S ANALYSIS

The First Amendment to the Constitution provides:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances.I°
In interpreting the extent to which the First Amendment
protects freedom of association, the United States Supreme Court
9. 530 U.S. 640.
10. U.S. CONST., amend. I.
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has recognized that this interest underlies -highly personal
relationships as well as various political, social, economic,
It is necessary to
religious, and educational endeavors. 1
understand how the Court's approach has evolved through various
cases in order to appreciate the need to modify this analysis.
Courts have long recognized that the First Amendment
protects the individual's right to enter into and maintain highly
personal relationships without unwarranted governmental
interference. 2 The earliest evidence of this associational right
emerged when the Supreme Court recognized parents' strong
liberty interest in directing the upbringing and education of their
children. 3 In Pierce v. Society of Sisters," a group of parents who
wanted to send their children to private school challenged an
Oregon statute requiring all parents to send their children, age
eight to sixteen, to public school." The State contended that it was
the sole teaching power within the state and that it only tolerated
The Court adopted a
the existence of private institutions.'6
compromise view of education by holding that the State has a right
to require children to attend school, but that parents have a
liberty interest in choosing the direction of their children's
education. 7 The association interest that parents have in raising
their children is personal and should be free from unjustified State
influence. 8
Beyond the general right to associate in highly personal
relationships, the First Amendment implies a right of expressive
association for political, social, economic, and religious reasons."
Freedom to associate for these purposes is necessary to protect the
freedoms of speech, religion, and the right to question the
government's decisions that lie at the heart of the First
Amendment. ° In other words, to deny individuals the right to
associate with other like-minded people would effectively infringe
upon their right to express themselves freely.
As is the case with many constitutional rights, States may
11. See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (ruling
that while students may be forced to attend school, the freedom of association
prohibits states from requiring students to attend public schools); Roberts v.
United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619-20 (1984) (recognizing that the
freedom of association protects individuals' personal freedom).
12. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 617-18.
13. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35.
14. 268 U.S. 510.
15. Id. at 529-30.
16. Id. at 533.
17. Id. at 534-35.
18. Id.
19. See, e.g., Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244-46 (1982) (holding that
denominational neutrality which is mandated by the First Amendment
assures that each religion enjoys the free exercise of religion).
20. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622.
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limit this right to associate for "expressive purposes" through
statutes or regulations that further a compelling state interest and
are not aimed at squelching speech.21 The most significant
promulgation of these state regulations has been in the form of
anti-discrimination laws prohibiting organizations that qualify as
public accommodations from discriminating against a variety of
different status groups.22
Application of these state antidiscrimination laws has increasingly clashed with organizations'
freedom of association under the First Amendment.23
A. Roberts v. United States Jaycees
The United States Supreme Court first addressed the conflict
between the freedom of association and a state anti-discrimination
statute in Roberts v.United States Jaycees,4 where the Court was
called upon to decide the constitutionality of a Minnesota statute
prohibiting sex-based discrimination in public accommodations.
In Roberts, several Minnesota chapters of the United States
Jaycees began accepting women into the organization as full
members contrary to the organization's national bylaws.
The
Jaycees is a national non-profit organization whose stated purpose
is to promote the "development of young men's civic organizations"
and to enhance the personal development and community
participation of young men. 7 Based on this objective, the national
organization prevented local chapters from recognizing some as
full members and sanctioned those chapters that disobeyed."
The local chapters sued the national organization in state
court under the Minnesota Human Rights Act for gender
discrimination, and the Jaycees responded by seeking injunctive
21. Id. at 623; See also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976) (stating that
governmental actions which impede the freedom of association must be closely

scrutinized).
22. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-4 (West Supp. 2000) (requiring access

to

employment,

in

all

places

of

public

accommodation

without

discriminations).
23. See, e.g., Roberts, 468 U.S. at 612 (involving a dispute over whether the
Minnesota Human Rights Act, which required the Jaycees to admit women as
regular members, impinged on the male members' freedom of association);
Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537, 541-42 (1987)

(addressing whether California's Unruh Act, which required the Rotary Club
to admit women, interfered with the male members' freedom of association);

Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S.
557, 561-62 (1995) (involving a dispute over whether the refusal to allow
members of a gay rights group to march in a parade violated the

Massachusetts public accommodations law).
24. 468 U.S. 609.
25. Id. at 624-25.
26. Id. at 614.
27. Id. at 612-13.
28. Id. at 614.
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relief in federal district court claiming that the forced admission of
women violated their freedom of association.29 In regards to the
state law issue, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the
Jaycees were a public accommodation within the meaning of the
statute and that the organization violated the statute by
discriminating against women.' °
The federal district court
subsequently ruled that to apply this statute to the Jaycees would
violate the group's freedom of association under the First
Amendment.3
The Eighth Circuit reversed, and on appeal, the United States
Supreme Court held that the application of the Minnesota antidiscrimination statute would not violate the Jaycees' freedom of
association." The Court began its analysis of the statute's effect
on the Jaycees by addressing the group's viewpoint or expressive
agenda and the extent to which it involved gender.' Speaking for
the Court, Justice Brennan stated that the Jaycees' focus on
"promot[ing] the views of young men" does not suggest that the
organization set forth a clear message on any particular issue.34
In light of this conclusion, the Court had no difficulty holding
that providing women complete membership rights in the group
would have little or no impact on its ability to promote its desired
views.35 In particular, Brennan asserted that there is no reason to
believe that allowing women to vote would change the Jaycees'
message. Furthermore, the Court ruled that it would not "indulge
in [such] sexual stereotyping."36 To the minor extent that the
organization's freedom of speech is infringed upon, the Court ruled
that the infringement was no more than necessary to accomplish
the compelling• interest
of preventing discrimination in public
37
accommodations.
Two years later in Board of Directors of Rotary International
v. Rotary Club,3 the Supreme Court re-affirmed its holding in
Roberts by upholding the application of a California antidiscrimination statute to Rotary International's membership
decisions.3 ' Rotary Club involved essentially the same facts as
Roberts. Rotary International revoked the charter of the Rotary
Club of Duarte after the club admitted several women as active

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. at 614-16.
Id. at 616-17.
Roberts, 468 U.S. at 616.
Id. at 625.
Id. at 627.
Id.
Id. at 627-28.
Id. at 628.
Id. at 628-29.
481 U.S. 537 (1987).
Id. at 549.
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members." In defending the Duarte club's suit under California's
Unruh Civil Rights Act, Rotary International claimed that
applying this statute to its decisions would infringe on the
organization's
freedom
of association
under the First
Amendment.4 '
Again, the United States Supreme Court began by explaining
that Rotary International and Rotary Clubs engage in a variety of
service activities, but do not advocate positions on issues regarding
women or any other topic.42 Therefore, the mandate of the
California law cannot impair the group's ability to carry on its
activities.' The Court further reasoned that even if the Rotary did
have some minimal expressive association, the admission of
women would not affect its ability to convey its message." The
Court also held that California's compelling interest in eliminating
discrimination against women was so significant that it trumped
any "slight infringement" Rotary members may suffer.4"
In these two cases, the Court correctly recognized that the
aspiring female members did not communicate a message that
contradicted the viewpoints of their respective groups. The Court's
method of analysis allowed it to determine that these
organizations possessed no First Amendment free speech interest
in discriminating against these women. These cases, however,
represented clear examples of status-based discrimination. When
an organization's exclusion of an individual is not so obviously
motivated by his status, this analysis results in an unnecessary
expansion of this freedom.
B. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of
Boston
Hurley v. Irish-American, Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of
Boston' presented the Supreme Court with a much different
situation than occurred eleven years earlier in Roberts. In this
case, a public accommodation rejected individuals as a result of
their actual message rather than some imputed message." The
Court's decision and reasoning together with Roberts and its
progeny draw an important distinction between the protections
afforded organizations that wish to exclude individuals because of
who they are and those who strive to keep certain people out

40. Id. at 541.
41. Id. at 543.

42. Id. at 548.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 549.
515 U.S. 557 (1995).
See id. at 561.
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because of their message.4
In Hurley, members of GLIB, a group of gay, lesbian, and
bisexual men and women of Irish ancestry, applied to participate
in Boston's annual St. Patrick's Day Parade as an expression of
their pride in being openly gay and Irish.49 Since 1947, a veteran's
council, an unincorporated association of private citizens from
Boston had organized the parade and obtained a permit from the
city.5" Although the organizers denied GLIB's request in 1992,
GLIB obtained a court order permitting the group's members to
take part in the parade as individuals without a banner
indentifying the group. 5 When GLIB's application to march was
again denied in 1993, the group sued the Council for violating
Massachusetts' public accommodations law, Massachusetts
General Laws Section 272:98, which banned discrimination in
public accommodations based, inter alia, on sexual orientation. 2
Both the trial court and the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts agreed that the Council did in fact violate the
statute by discriminating against GLIB, and that there was no
merit to the Council's claim that allowing the group to march
would infringe upon its right to expressive association under the
First Amendment. The Massachusetts high court reasoned that
nothing about the parade indicated that it conveyed a particular
message or had an expressive purpose.'
After reviewing the circumstances and legal issues involved
in the case, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the parade
organizers possessed a right of expressive association in the
parade and that the State's mandate admitting GLIB infringed on
this right 5 The Court began by stating that a parade is not
merely organized for the purpose of walking through the town, but
carries with it the collective message of those who actively take
This message is embodied not only in the signs,
part in it.'
banners, and chants, but also in the symbolic expression of the
parade's participants. 57 Although the Court did not expressly refer
to the parade as an expressive association, it afforded it similar
treatment.58
48. See id. at 572-73; see Roberts, 468 U.S. at 670 (ruling that preventing
Jaycees from excluding women will not change the content of the
organization's speech).
49. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 561.
50. Id. at 560.
51. Id. at 561.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 563-64.
54. Id. at 564.
55. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 573.
56. Id. at 568.
57. Id. at 569.
58. Dale, 530 U.S. at 659.
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In a unanimous opinion, Justice Souter suggested that the
anti-discrimination statute would effectively prevent the
organizers from excluding homosexuals from participating in the
parade generally. 9 The Council did not prevent the members of
GLIB from marching in the parade as individual openly gay IrishAmericans, but rather refused to allow the group to carry its own
banner.' The Court reasoned that GLIB's desire to march in the
parade was motivated by the opportunity to express its message
that gay Irish-Americans should be celebrated as an important
part of the Irish community.6' Massachusetts could not compel the
organizers of the parade to include this message in its parade,
because to do so would deprive them of their freedom of expressive
association under the First Amendment.62
The Court's reasoning in Hurley is unique because the
organization was the parade organizers whose message was more
"public" than the average public accommodation.' In this regard,
the Court was careful to allow the organizers to closely control any
message conveyed by the parade.' Had this case involved a nonparade public accommodation, excluded GLIB members should
have received greater attention in determining whether they
significantly infringed on the organizers' message. The Supreme
Court clearly downplayed Hurley's uniqueness when it decided
Dale in the 2000 term. Examining the Court's opinion in Dale
illustrates its misplaced reliance on Hurley, and the inadequacy of
the Court's doctrinal approach.

II. BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA V. DALE
The nature of the claim presented in Dale did not differ
greatly from the freedom of association challenges to state antidiscrimination statutes made in the aforementioned cases.
However, the nature of the Boy Scouts; and James Dale's position
as a homosexual leader of young children sparked a great deal
more public interest and debate among liberal and conservative
groups alike. This politically charged climate only intensified by
the time the case reached the United States Supreme Court.
A. Facts
James Dale entered the Boy Scouts of America in 1978 by
joining Monmouth Council, New Jersey's local Cub Scout pack. He
remained an active member of the organization until 1990.6"
59. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 572.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 570.

62. Id. at 575.

63. Id. at 560-61.
64. Id. at 580-81.
65. Dale, 530 U.S. at 644.
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During this time he excelled earning the highly acclaimed Eagle
Scout Badge, speaking at various Scout functions, and in 1989
becoming an adult leader.'
In 1989, Dale enrolled at Rutgers
University, and after realizing that he was gay, he admitted his
homosexuality to his family and friends.67 He became the copresident of Rutgers University Lesbian/Gay Alliance, and in July
1990, he was interviewed about the group by the Star Ledger, a
Newark newspaper.' The article included a photograph of Dale,
which identified him as a homosexual, and his comments about his
experience in looking for a positive role model in the gay
community when he was a young man.'
After the article was published, Dale's local chapter expelled
him from the Boy Scouts on the grounds that the organization does
not grant membership to homosexuals. 0 He subsequently sought
information about the Boy Scouts' policy regarding membership
and leadership standards to understand and eventually challenged
this decision. 7
The Boy Scouts of America is a federally chartered
corporation that has had eighty-seven million members since its
inception in 1910." Its mission is:

to promote, through organization, and cooperation with other
agencies, the ability of boys to do things for themselves and others,
to train them in scoutcraft, and to teach them patriotism, courage,
self-reliance, and kindred virtues... m
The oath of the Boy Scouts further states that each Scout will
do his best "[t]o keep [him]self physically strong, mentally awake,
and morally straight.""
However, in terms of morality the
organization advises its members that what is right and wrong
should be determined by what is in their hearts and heads. 5
The organization did not make a public statement or take a
public position on homosexuality before revoking Dale's
membership."6
In 1978, the Boy Scouts did draft a position
statement maintaining that an openly gay individual may not be a
member or a volunteer leader within the organization.77 This
statement was not released to the public or group members. In

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id.
Id. at 644-45.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 697.
Dale, 530 U.S. at 666.
Id.
Id. at 1203.
Id. at 673-74 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 651-52.
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fact, no such statement relating to homosexuality was ever
released before Dale filed his lawsuit.
Only after Dale's
membership was revoked did the group distribute two position
statements which declared that homosexuality was inconsistent
with a "morally straight" life. 8
Dale pursued review of this action through the group's review
board and the Regional Director, but was unsuccessful." He then
sued the Boy Scouts alleging that dismissing him from the
organization because of his sexual orientation violated the New
Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD).8" The Boy Scouts
contended that applying LAD to force the group to include
homosexual members would violate its freedom of expressive
association. 81
B. New Jersey State Court Proceedings
The state court case contained both the claim of
discrimination under LAD and the Boy Scouts' assertion that even
if it violated LAD, the statute could not be applied without
violating the defendant's First Amendment rights.82 The New
Jersey Supreme Court had the final word on the question of state
law; the Constitutional issue could be appealed to the United
States Supreme Court.'
1. New Jersey Superior Court
The trial court held that the Boy Scouts were not a "public
accommodation" under the New Jersey anti-discrimination
statute, and therefore Dale had no cause of action against the
organization.84 On appeal, the New Jersey Superior Court
reversed.85 The appellate court reasoned that the Boy Scouts' local
chapters were public accommodations, since they sought
membership from the general public and maintained relationships
with other established public accommodations.86 Therefore, the
organization violated LAD when it removed Dale. The Court also
rejected the Boy Scouts' freedom of expressive association claim,
because there was an insufficient link between the group's
expressive activities and its exclusion of homosexuals.88 Both
78. Id. at 674 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
79. Dale, 734 A.2d at 1205.
80. Id.
81. Dale v. Boy Scouts of America, 706 A.2d 270, 284-85 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1998).
82. Id.
83. Dale, 734 A.2d at 1219.
84. Id. at 1205-06
85. Id. at 1206.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1207. The N.J. Supreme Court described the court's ruling as
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parties petitioned the New Jersey Supreme Court for review.89
2. New Jersey Supreme Court
After granting the parties' petitions for review, the State
Supreme Court resolved the state law discrimination claim by
affirming the Superior Court's ruling that the Boy Scouts is a
place of public accommodation under LAD and that the
organization discriminated against James Dale.9" By holding that
the Scouts violated the New Jersey statute, the Court was
required to reach the group's claim that application of the statute
infringes on its First Amendment rights.9 1
The Court recognized the two interests embodied in the
Freedom of Association: the freedom to enter into intimate
associations and the freedom to engage in expressive association.92
As to the freedom of intimate association, the Court held that the
Boy Scouts was not the type of small organization in which
members maintain highly personal relationships afforded
Constitutional protection.93 In reaching this decision, the Court
focused not only on the size of the organization, but on its very
open selection process and inclusive policy.94
Turning to the more relevant freedom of expressive
association, the Court focused on the framework the United States
Supreme Court set forth in Roberts and Hurley. In the majority
opinion, Justice Poritz acknowledged that while this freedom
preserves an organization's right to associate with other people in
"pursuit of... political, social, economic, educational, religious,
and cultural ends," such protection only allows the exclusion of an
individual who "significant[ly]" affects the group's message.99 The
Court further pointed to the permissibility of infringement upon
this right when the United States Supreme Court has found a
compelling state interest.9
The Court then analyzed whether the Boy Scouts was a group
that maintained a public position on an issue or expressed a
particular message. 97 After concluding that the group advocated
follows: "Although the court accepted the argument that the First Amendment
protects Boy Scouts goals and activities, it determined that the relationship
between Boy Scouts' stated goals and Boy Scouts' exclusionary practice was
not significant enough to overcome the compelling stated interest in
eradicating invidious discrimination." Id.
89. Id. at 1200.
90. Dale, 734 A.2d at 1218.
91. Id. at 1219.
92. Id. at 1220, 1222-23.
93. Id. at 1221.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1222.
96. Id. at 1223.
97. Dale, 734 A.2d at 1226.
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that its members be "morally straight" and "clean," the Court held
that the application of New Jersey's LAD did not significantly
affect its ability to express this view.9" Since the organization's
message did not openly favor the exclusion of homosexuals or the
discouragement of homosexual behavior, the Court did not believe
that admitting Dale would have much impact on the Scout's
message of moral integrity. 99
The New Jersey Supreme Court distinguished this case from
Hurley.0 ' The Court reasoned that unlike the Hurley marchers,
Dale was not seeking to convey any message about homosexuality
to the other Scout members.0 1 While inclusion of the GLIB banner
in Hurley would have significantly burdened the parade
organizers' message, Dale's continued membership would not have
similarly affected the Boy Scouts ability to express its views.' 2
This is highlighted by the distinction between a parade, in which
speech is the sole purpose for organizing, and a group such as the
Boy Scouts, whose message has developed throughout its
existence.
C. United States Supreme Court
After the New Jersey Supreme Court disposed of the issue
under New Jersey's anti-discrimination law, the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide if applying the state
law to the Boy Scouts' action would infringe on the organization's
First Amendment right of expressive association. 3
The Court began by addressing the issue of whether the Boy
Scouts engaged in "expressive association" so as to be able to claim
such a right.' 4 After briefly examining the organization's mission
statement and the Scout Oath, the majority concluded that by
communicating its views regarding the morality and values of its
members, the Scouts did engage in expressive association.' 5 The
Court further reasoned that if the Boy Scouts assert that 0it6
believes homosexuality is immoral, it must accept this position.
The Court, as a result, accepted the organization's declaration in
its brief that it "teaches that homosexual conduct is not morally
straight" and pointed to the unreleased 1978 position statement as
evidence of this assertion."'

98. Id. at 1223-24.
99. Id. at 1225.

100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Dale, 530 U.S. at 644.

104.
105.
106.
107.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

648.
648-51.
651.
651-52.
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In the majority opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist next
considered the more difficult question of whether forcing the Boy
Scouts to readmit Dale would "significantly affect" its ability to
communicate its viewpoints inside and outside the organization. °8
Instead of making its own reasoned determination of whether
Dale's views would impair the organization's expression, the Court
again deferred to the Boy Scouts' assertions."
In dissent, Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer, sharply attacked the Court's peripheral
inquiry into whether the Boy Scouts actually maintain a position
against gays and homosexual behavior as wholly inadequate."' It
is not enough for a group to publicly assert its position on an issue
for the first time during litigation as the Scouts do here."' This
would allow the freedom of expressive association to serve as a
procedural method for an organization to justify its discriminatory
exclusion of certain individuals."' Justice Stevens argued that in
no other context has the Court felt beholden to accept a party's
assertions on a legal issue such as this."'
The majority further asserted that Dale's status as an openly
gay member of the community was inapposite to the Scouts'
averred teachings."' Forcing the group to readmit Dale would
have required it to communicate to "the youth members and the
world, that the Boy Scouts accepts homosexual conduct as a
legitimate form of behavior."" 5 The Court concluded that Dale's
membership would "significantly burden" the Scouts' ability to
express its views on homosexuality and therefore
would intrude on
6
the group's freedom of expressive association.1
In reaching this conclusion, Chief Justice Rehnquist
analogizes this case with Hurley claiming that Dale would
interfere with the Boy Scouts' decision not to support homosexual
behavior to the same extent that GLIB would have interfered with
the message of the parade organizers in Hurley."' The Court
emphasized that all of a group's views are protected, and thus it
was inconsequential that anti-homosexuality was not the Scouts'
core purpose.
The Court further held that New Jersey's interest
in preventing discrimination in places of public accommodation
does not overcome the violation of the Scouts' First Amendment
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id. at 654.
Id. at 655-56.
Dale, 530 U.S. at 686 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 685-86.
Id. at 651-55.
Id. at 653.
Id. at 659.
Dale, 530 U.S. at 659.
Id. at 661.
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rights, because unlike the circumstances in Roberts, this
infringement was substantial. 9
Justice Stevens, in his dissent, argued that even if one
accepts the Court's assumption that Dale's homosexual status
contradicts the Scouts' teachings, it is quite a stretch to claim that
merely including him would force the group to convey a different
message.12 0 Neither the First Amendment nor the Boy Scouts'
policy requires all members within the organization to agree on all
of the policies. '21 1 The dissent contended that allowing Dale as a
the different
member would send no more of a message than
12 2
viewpoints of the group's heterosexual members.
III. A NEW ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK: RECOGNIZING A DISTINCTION
BETWEEN AN INDIVIDUAL'S SPEECH AND STATUS AND CLARIFYING THE
QUESTION OF WHEN AN INDIVIDUAL SUBSTANTIALLY INFRINGES UPON
AN ORGANIZATION'S FREEDOM OF EXPRESSIVE ASSOCIATION.

In analyzing whether application of a state antidiscrimination law infringes upon an organization's First
Amendment freedom of expressive association, the Supreme Court
focuses most of its attention on whether that organization is
expressing a viewpoint, and if so what that viewpoint is. 2' While
this inquiry is essential in determining the scope of protection that
should be afforded the organization, it is equally if not more
important whether the views and, in rare cases, the status of the
burden" the
excluded individual will actually "significantly
24
organization's ability to express its message.1
In deciding the later issue, it is necessary to go beyond the
deferential approach by which the Court allows the organization
itself to determine whether its message will be impaired. The
standard endorsed by the Court in Dale12 ' allows an organization
to justify almost every exclusion it makes, including
discriminatory ones, by alleging post-hoc that the individual
weakened its message in some way.'26 Justice Stevens, in his
dissent, takes particular exception with the majority's view that
the Court "cannot doubt" an organization's assertion that an

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id. at 657-58; Roberts, 468 U.S. at 626.
Dale, 530 U.S. at 691.
Id. at 689-91.
Id. at 692.
Id. at 648-59.

124. See Hunter, supra note 8, at 27 (criticizing the New Jersey Supreme
Court's analysis of the Boy Scouts' freedom of association claim for failing to
address whether Dale's statement identifying himself as a homosexual
conveyed a message). According to Hunter, this inquiry is one of three
essential elements of what she refers to as an expressive identity claim. Id.
125. Dale, 530 U.S. at 650-53.
126. Id. at 686-87 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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individual impairs its message."'
He maintains that the
parameters of a constitutional right, especially the First
Amendment, has never been and may not now be left in the hands
of the organization itself.121 In Roberts, the Court itself seems to
have mandated that an "unsupported generalization" about the
relative interests and perspectives" of different groups of people
may not be uncritically accepted. 29
Instead, the Court must undertake a thorough review of the
facts and circumstances of each case to determine whether the
forced inclusion of a certain individual will actually hamper the
organization's ability to communicate its message. This inquiry
must focus on the individual and whether his speech or status will
"significantly burden" the organization's viewpoint.
It is
extremely important to distinguish between situations where an
individual's speech is claimed to threaten an organization's
freedom of expressive association and those where an individual's
status is at issue. Professor Hunter emphasizes the importance of
focusing on the viewpoint attributed to the individual both in
analyzing an organization's right to associate and in ensuring that
the individual's equality rights are protected. 3 ° The remainder of
this Article will build upon the former proposition and attempt to
offer a more refined analysis of when the freedom of association
should shield an organization from the operation of state antidiscrimination laws.
There are two general situations where forcing organizations
to admit individuals may "significantly infringe" the groups'
ability to express their views. The first of these occurs when an
individual makes statements that convey a viewpoint inapposite to
the organization's established message.
The individual's
comments on a particular issue can be compared with this
message to determine if he or she will impose such a burden on the
organization. Where such a burden exists, the organization's First
Amendment rights are clearly implicated, because the
organization's ability to express its message would be greatly
weakened if it were forced to accept individuals who have spoken
out against this message."' In effect, the organization would be
127. Id.
128. See id. (refusing to "... defer to whatever position an organization is
prepared to assert in its briefs.., as an improper way to mark ...
the proper
boundary between genuine exercises of the right to associate, [...], and sham
claims that are simply attempts to insulate nonexpressive private
discrimination").
129. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 628 (condemning legal decision making that
relies uncritically on such generalizations).
130. Hunter, supra note 8, at 20.
131. See, e.g., Hurley, 515 U.S. 576 (maintaining that "when the
dissemination of a view contrary to one's own is forced upon a speaker
intimately connected with the communication advanced, the speaker's right to
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required to endorse speech with which it does not agree.13
The second situation occurs when an organization excludes an
individual, not because of statements he made, but because his
status alone compels the organization to adopt or accept a message
that runs contrary to its fundamental views or purpose. It will be
much more difficult for a court to conclude that an individual's
status conveys a message that would conflict with the group's
views to such an extent that including him would constitute a
"significant burden." The Court should scrutinize such cases
where an organization dismisses an individual for his status,
because they do not touch nearly as closely upon the interests
underlying the First Amendment. To the contrary, excluding
individuals based on their identity or status involves the
dangerous underhanded discriminatory motives that have long
pervaded social and political organizations. The First Amendment
should not be used as a shield to permit such discrimination
unless the group's freedom of speech, religion, or assembly
demands such protection. Therefore, for one's identity to meet this
standard, the organization's views against a particular status
group should not only be clearly expressed, but should also be the
central purpose of the organization.'33
In order to fully understand the speech-status distinction and
when each general category will "significantly burden" an
organization's ability to express its message, it is necessary to
discuss the different circumstances in which speech and status
cases may arise. Situations where an organization might claim
that an individual's speech or status is at odds with its message
may be broken down into five categories: (1) the individual
expresses views contrary to those of the organization;'
(2) the
individual's status conveys a message with which the group does
not agree;... (3) the individual's status in itself is alleged to
contradict the organization's message;"' (4) the individual's
statements are actually an extension of his identity;137 and (5)
autonomy over the message is compromised").

132. Id.
133. See, e.g., Invisible Empire of the Knight of the Klu Klux Klan v. Town of
Thurmont, 700 F. Supp. 281, 289 (D. Md. 1988); See also Dale, 734 A.2d at

1225 (holding that the Boy Scouts' First Amendment right of association was

not at all burdened because the organization had no views on homosexuality
that would qualify as a "unifying associative goal"); Dale, 530 U.S. at 683

(Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that "[tihe relevant question is whether the
mere inclusion of the person at issue would 'impose any serious burden'. . . [on]
the organization's 'shared goals,' 'basic goals,' or 'collective effort to foster
beliefs').
134. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 557.
135. See generally Hunter, supra note 8, at 28 (maintaining that selfidentification is more than a label).
136. See generally Roberts, 468 U.S. at 609; Dale, 530 U.S. at 648.
137. Hunter, supra note 8, at 20.
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hybrid cases where an individual's statements and status are at
issue. Each of these categories will be explained and analyzed in
subsection A in order to help refine the inquiry into whether an
individual will "significantly burden" a public accommodation's
freedom of association.
The need for this speech-status distinction becomes clearer
after examining the purpose of the First Amendment and the
interests underlying the freedom of expressive association. These
interests, which will be discussed in subsection B, will show that
while the First Amendment supports an organization's right to
exclude individuals who express views that hinder its ability to
communicate its message, it generally does not support exclusion
based on status.
A. Boundaries of the Speech-Status Distinction
Before applying this speech-status dichotomy as part of a
thorough analysis of whether an individual's forced inclusion will
"significantly burden" an organization's message, it is necessary to
examine the scope of this distinction. As mentioned above, not
every case involves a clear distinction between an individual's
speech and his status. Instead, there are five different categories
of either speech or status that may describe an organization's
exclusion of an individual for infringing on its ability to
communicate its message. Understanding these categories helps
to provide a framework for deciding whether an individual is being
excluded because of his speech or his status, and whether the
reason for this exclusion significantly burdens the organization's
message.
Speech That Conveys a Viewpoint
The first type of case occurs when the individual makes a
statement that expresses a viewpoint potentially in conflict with
the message of the organization in which he seeks to be admitted.
Under these circumstances, the individual's statement equals
viewpoint "speech" from the standpoint that it goes beyond being
mere words to expressing a message for freedom of speech
purposes. The classic illustration of this situation arises where an
individual who seeks admission into an anti-abortion organization
states either publicly or privately that a woman's right to choose
whether or not to have an abortion should be protected. The
individual's statement clearly expresses a message, and therefore
constitutes viewpoint "speech" rather than mere words without a
message. The Court could then decide whether the individual's
speech actually significantly infringed upon the group's ability to
1.

138. The author contends that Dale falls into this category.
discussed in Section IV.

This will be
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express its anti-abortion views.
Although not as unmistakable as the previous example,
Hurley provides another example of this category.139 In Hurley,
GLIB maintained a clear position that Irish homosexuals should
be accepted as just as important a part of the Irish community as
Irish heterosexuals. 4 ' The Supreme Court correctly determined
that forcing the parade organizers to permit GLIB to march with
its banner would be an expressive act that imposed the
organization's message upon them.4 Although Hurley involved an
expressive act rather than a particular statement, it similarly
involved the expression of a view contrary to that of the parade
organizers.
2. Statements Equal Status
Every time an individual makes a statement, however, he
does not express a viewpoint or engage in viewpoint "speech." In
certain situations, an individual's statement or conduct may not
convey a message at all, but instead may be what Professor
Hunter deems "expressive identity" or an expression of one's
status or identity. 42 Examples in which this may arise include
when an individual affirms his or her ethnic identity, when a
homosexual comes out of the closet, or when a person with AIDS
discloses his or her illness. In all of these hypothetical situations
the individuals have made a statement, but none of the statements
express a particular viewpoint. Instead, these statements merely
identify them as members of their respective status groups.
Although not squarely within this paradigm, a similar
situation arose in Roberts, where the Jaycees tried to exclude
women from holding full membership because it believed that
their identity as women would lead them to express views that
contradicted the group's message." Although the Jaycees claimed
that it excluded women because they maintained different views,
the underlying reason was based upon their identity as women."'
The Supreme Court ruled that discriminating against women in
this context was not protected by the organization's freedom of
expressive association, because nothing suggests that women will
express a particular viewpoint as a result of their identity.145 In
other words, an organization may not assume that a woman will

139. Cf Hurley, 515 U.S. at 574 (concluding that GLIB was conveying a
message when it sought to participate in the parade).
140. Id.
141. Id. at 575.
142. Hunter, supra note 8, at 20-21.
143. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 615-16.
144. Id. at 627.
145. Id. at 626-27.
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express certain views merely because she is a woman. 46' This
reasoning applies not only to women, but also to members of any
status group, such as African-Americans or homosexuals.'47
Despite agreeing with the Court's protection of women's right
of expressive identity, Professor Hunter argues that the Court
failed to distinguish between viewpoint and "point of viewing."1
She asserts that for both First Amendment jurisprudence and
Equal Protection analysis, the Court must distinguish between
members who are "mouthpiece[s]" of their respective groups, and
members of certain "socially constituted" groups who declare that
they have a unique and worthwhile point of view that should be
entitled to the same liberties as other groups.14 Hunter argues
that to effectuate equality, the latter "point of viewing" statements
organizations'
should not be deemed viewpoint
50 speech in analyzing
rights.
association
of
freedom
In extending her analysis of the freedom of expressive
association into the realm of equality jurisprudence, Hunter
encounters the danger of extending this protection of expressive
identity too far. On several occasions, the Court has refused to
impute a particular viewpoint from one's point of view because the
harm to individuals with those points of view has far outweighed
the clarity such a distinction might achieve. 5 1 While recognizing a
distinction in this context would not harm the individual, it would
threaten the organization's freedom of expressive association.
It is one thing for an individual to acknowledge that he is a
member of an organization and that he is personally proud of his
association, but it is quite another for that individual to say that
members of his status group have a valuable point of view. For
example, an individual who says he is gay and proud of it does not
go beyond expressing his identity. Stating that as a gay person he
has a unique point of view that society should not denigrate,
however, is much closer to coming within the first category of
viewpoint speech rather than "status." Therefore, exempting
Hunter's interpretation of "point of viewing" from viewpoint
speech would limit the scope of freedom of expressive association
to which organizations are entitled. Organizations would be
forced, in effect, to adopt the individual's point of view.
3. Status Equals Status
In more egregious cases, an organization will deny admission
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
613.

Id. at 628.
Hunter, supra note 8, at 20.
Id. at 21.
Id. at 21-22
Id. at 22.
See generally Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993); Roberts, 468 U.S. at
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to an individual of a particular identity or status, not because he
has made a statement that is arguably related to his identity, but
simply because he is a member of that status group. In the vast
majority of these situations, the individual's status will not convey
a message or viewpoint that may be understood to substantially
burden the organization's fundamental views or purpose. Instead,
this category involves discrimination in its purest form, and as will
be discussed in the following section, does not implicate any First
Amendment interests.
Although Roberts involved potential elements of "speech," the
case is especially relevant here. The national office of the Jaycees
did attempt to exclude women from obtaining full membership in
the organization because they were women. 52 The Supreme Court
dismissed any idea that due to their identity as women, female
members would automatically express views that contradicted the
organization's primary message or goal of cultivating the lives of
young men.'53 While there may have been at least a theoretical
conflict between women's status and the group's message, the
Jaycees' action helps to illuminate this type of pure status case.
A more obvious example would be found where an
organization such as the United States Jaycees or Rotary
International excluded African-Americans or Hispanics without
any individual expression of views contrary to their position. In
these situations, including individuals from these status groups
would not impose an unwanted message on the organization
because the central purpose or message of these organizations
does not address minorities or minority issues. When there is no
such conflict between the individual's status and the
organization's fundamental views, the freedom of expressive
association should not operate to limit the application of states'
anti-discrimination statutes.
4.

Status Equals Viewpoint Speech

Not all cases where an organization excludes an individual for
his status should be analyzed as pure "status" cases under the
previous category. In a limited number of situations, where the
central focus of an organization's message is opposition toward a
particular status group, including a member of that identity would
compel the organization to endorse the message that it tolerated
these individuals. This compulsion would "significantly infringe"
on the group's ability to express its fundamental message and
purpose for organizing.
While allowing such morally
reprehensible groups to discriminate further in accordance with
their views seems counterintuitive, doing so in these cases is

152. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 613.
153. Id. at 627.
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necessary to protect the groups' constitutionally recognized
freedom of speech. The First Amendment does not limit free
speech rights to socially acceptable points of view." Most statusbased exclusions, however, simply involve covert discrimination
that is neither connected to nor consistent with the organization's
core beliefs.
The most obvious and hotly debated example of this category
involves the Ku Klux Klan.1 55 The Klan is an organization whose
sole purpose is to promote its racist view that African-Americans
and other ethnic and religious groups are inferior to whites. There
is little doubt that if a black man or woman wanted to join the
group, he or she would be denied membership. This situation is
clearly distinguishable from a case where an organization such as
the Jaycees discriminates against a member of a particular status
group. Unlike the Jaycees, the Klan's entire existence rests on its
belief that minorities are inferior. To require the group to include
an African-American would force the organization to endorse the
view that it tolerated African-Americans, which is entirely
inapposite to its purpose. Therefore, the organization would be
excluding African-Americans because their status conveys a
message in this context.
Where an organization's purpose is not centered on racist or
xenophobic views, it may not claim that including members of
certain racial or ethnic identities would compel it to accept a
message that contradicts its views. No one would perceive the
acceptance of an African-American member as communicating any
message where the group does not promote a fundamentally racist
position.
M

5. Hybrid Cases Involving Status and Speech
The final category of speech-status situations arises when it is
unclear whether an individual has been denied admission to a
public accommodation because of his status or his speech. This
situation is especially relevant when the individual is a
homosexual, because in the course of making a statement, he may
both disclose his status and convey his views on homosexuality.
With members of other status groups, such as iacial minorities,
this is less likely to be relevant, both because their status is likely
self-evident and thus no speech is necessary, and because a
statement that, "I am African-American" does not usually connote
a viewpoint. Because it will often be difficult in hybrid cases to
determine what the actual reason for the exclusion is, the court
must undertake a thorough analysis to determine whether either
the individual's status or speech qualifies as viewpoint speech

154. Dale, 530 U.S. at 660.
155. Hunter, supra note 8, at 28.
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under the previous categories.
6. Viewpoint Speech May "SubstantiallyInfringe" Upon An
Organization'sFreedom of Association.
After determining which category applies to a particular
public membership decision, federal courts will be in a much
better position to decide whether inclusion of the individual will
"significantly infringe" the organization's ability to express its
message. When an individual's statement, status, or statementstatus hybrid constitutes viewpoint speech, the Court must
compare the individual's message with that of the public
accommodation.
If the individual's expressed views severely
intrude on the group's freedom of expressive association, the
freedom of association protects the exclusion of that individual.
When the organization's action falls into the status equals
status or statements equal status categories, the freedom of
association should afford the group no protection from state
regulation. As will be discussed in subsection B, the interests
underlying the First Amendment do not extend to such statusbased discrimination, and therefore neither should the protection
of the freedom of association.
B. The Interests Underlying the FirstAmendment Support an
Organization'sFreedom to Associate or Disassociatewith
Individuals When its Freedomof Speech is Implicated.
This doctrinal shift emphasizing an initial inquiry into the
organization's reason for excluding a particular individual will not
only clarify and refine the Court's analysis of whether the
organization's freedom of association rights are violated, but will
limit the Court's application of this freedom to protect only those
rights the First Amendment was initially intended to safeguard.
As discussed previously, the freedom of association protects
various intimate associations, such as freedom to marry, freedom
to choose whether one's children go to public or private school, and
freedom from other government interference."'
An examination of the purposes underlying the First
Amendment will help to show that beyond these highly personal
interests, the freedom of association should generally operate to
protect an organization's free speech rights, but should not serve
as an end in itself. When an organization excludes an individual
based on his status, there is generally no discernable right of
speech at stake, and the Constitution should not protect such
Distinguishing between expressive
discriminatory behavior.1 7
156. See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925)
(upholding parents' right to send their children to public or private school).
157. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 627 (stating the Constitution should not protect
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speech and status cases helps to give effect to these policies and to
ensure that the court properly applies the freedom of association.
The First Amendment, which contains direct evidence of the
framers' intent, provides the ideal starting point to ascertain the
proper scope of the freedom of association.
It must first be
reiterated that nowhere in the language of the Amendment or any
constitutional precursor do the founding fathers set forth or even
mention a right of association"
Within the Amendment,
however, this right is implicated both in its protection of
individuals' right to peaceably assemble and in its assurance of the
right to "petition the Government for a redress of grievances."159
The origins of association and its importance in American society
are also firmly rooted in American scholarship and literature. In
1839, Alexis de Tocqueville heralded the American right of
political association as an essential check against the "tyranny of
the majority" from silencing the voice of the minority."6 ° This
principle motivated the founding fathers revolution against the
tyrannical rule England exercised over them.
While scholars such as Tocqueville wrote of individuals'
freedom to associate in the abstract, it has been the courts that
have given legal effect to this right as attendant to the
constitutional right of free speech."' From early cases in this area
to more recent decisions, the Supreme Court has been extremely
hesitant to regulate associations where to do so would limit an
organization's freedom to exercise its clearly delineated First
Amendment rights.'62 The Court has recognized an individual's
right to associate for "a wide variety of political, social, economic,
educational, religious, and cultural ends.""
This does not suggest, however, that this freedom is absolute.
The Court has recognized an absolute right to free association only
in the most limited circumstances involving a "narrow range of
activities." Generally, this right only exists when it helps protect
other established rights."
The freedom of association does not
such behavior).
158. DAVID FELLMAN, ConstitutionalRights of Association, in FREE SPEECH
AND ASSOCIATION: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT, at 23-84

(Philip B. Kurland ed., University of Chicago Press 1975) (1961).
159. See AMY GUTMANN, Freedom of Association: An Introductory Essay, in
FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION, at 3-31 (Amy Gutmann ed., Princeton University
Press 1998) (1998) (quoting U.S. CONST., amend. I.).
160. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, 194-95 (Phillips

Bradley ed., Vol. 1 1972) (1945).
161. See, e.g., Louisiana ex. rel. Gremillion, 366 U.S. 293, 297 (1961)
(describing case law limiting disclosoure of associational ties).

Hurley, 515

U.S. at 575.
162. Louisianaex. rel. Gremillion, 366 U.S. at 297.
163. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622.

164. Id.
165. GEORGE KATEB, The Value ofAssociation, in FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION,
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exist and "cannot function in a social and political vacuum," but
instead must yield to government regulation when it would
infringe on other rights.16
Therefore, every action taken by a
group associating for expressive purposes is not immune from
scrutiny. The Court has been quite willing to regulate the
activities of associations, including their membership policies,
where they serve no First Amendment rights or violate
"compelling state interests."6 7
Most cases in this area focus on the later form of regulation,
limiting the freedom of association as opposed to regulating
activities that do not implicate this right. The theory underlying
this article's proposed reformulation of this constitutional doctrine,
however, rests upon the view that only in the rarest circumstances
will status-based discrimination constitute an exercise of a group's
constitutional rights of association. Therefore, most often a state
will not even need "compelling interests" for regulating these
decisions. Membership decisions are typically thought of as an
extension of an organization's expressive purpose, because
members with publicly divergent views may dilute or alter the
group message.16 Some scholars maintain that this logic applies
to all membership decisions regardless of the group's justification
for exclusion.169 This theory offers far too broad a view of the
freedom of association as it recognizes it as a right existing
independent of any First Amendment interests underlying these
decisions. One commentator more deftly delineated the scope of
this protection by positing that when an organization's main
purpose is to convey a particular viewpoint, "its freedom to select
members consistently with its expressive purposes is essential to
its members' exercise of free speech through the association."7 °
Although arguing for a more expansive view of the freedom of
association, Gutmann's position is not entirely inconsistent with
the view that an organization's freedom of association should only
serve its free speech interests. Decisions to exclude certain
individuals, not because they possess divergent views, but because
they are members of a different status group, generally implicate
no such expressive speech and should not receive constitutional
protection. Although the Roberts' Court ruled that the regulation
at issue was narrowly tailored to achieve its purpose, Justice

at 35-63 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1998); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1014-10 (Foundation Press 1988) (1978).
166. FELLMAN, supra note 158, at 50.
167. See, e.g., Roberts 468 U.S. at 623 (stating freedom to associate is not an
absolute right); Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Committee, 459 U.S.
87, 91-92 (1982).
168. GUTMANN, supra note 159.
169. See, e.g., KATEB, supra note 165.
170. GUTMANN, supra note 159, at 11.
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Brennan emphasized that "expressive activities that produce
special harms distinct from their communicative impact.., are
entitled to no constitutional protection." 7'
Even if the Court were to determine that status-based
discrimination does, in some way, implicate free speech or other
First Amendment interests, states' regulation of this invidious
discrimination should in most cases qualify as a "compelling state
interest" that only incidentally infringes on an organization's right
of expressive association. Roberts provides the clearest example of
this situation.
In that case, the Supreme Court held that
Minnesota's regulation of the United States Jaycees' admission
policy did not violate the freedom of association because the state's
interest in eradicating discrimination based on sex was compelling
and imposed no serious burden on the male members' freedom of
expressive association.17' The Court further reasoned that this
interest was not related to suppressing ideas and could not be
"achieved through means significantly less restrictive of
associational freedoms." '
The Massachusetts statute at issue in Hurley, however, while
certainly furthering a compelling interest, was not narrowly
tailored to its goal of eliminating discrimination against
homosexuals. Therefore, it was not the least restrictive means of
achieving the goal."' The parade organizers did not prevent
homosexuals from marching in the parade, " 5 but instead only
excluded GLIB members who intended to march with their
organization's banner.'76 These individuals were not excluded
solely due to their status. To the contrary, they were excluded
because their participation in the parade would have compelled
the organizers to recognize gays and lesbians as a valuable part of
the Irish community in Boston. 7
Therefore, requiring the
organizers to allow GLIB members to march would have resulted
in more than an incidental infringement on their ability to express
their views. 7 ' Hurley represents a unique and difficult case,
because a parade is a much more visible and concentrated
expression of ideas than other public accommodations. 7 9 Its
holding should be viewed in this limited context and should not be
broadly applied to dissimilar situations.
A clearer example of a case where the application of an anti-
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discrimination statute severely restricts an organization's ability
to express its viewpoint would occur where a state applies such
legislation to the Ku Klux Klan's exclusion of an AfricanAmerican. Again, the state's interest in eradicating discrimination
is no doubt compelling. However, the statute's application to an
organization that exists for the main purpose of hatred toward
racial, ethnic, religious, and cultural minorities severely infringes
on the group's free speech rights. As the Supreme Court suggested
in United States v. O'Brien, an individual or organization must
first have an opportunity to express its views regarding the
application of such regulation for that regulation to qualify as the
least restrictive means of achieving its purpose."' While an
organization with a neutral viewpoint on racial and ethnic
minorities would have no difficulty in continuing the expression of
its message, the KKK would be forced to contradict its entire
purpose for existence and therefore have no opportunity to
legitimately maintain its bigoted message against AfricanAmericans.
At first, it may appear antithetical to afford such
constitutional protection to these groups and not to a more socially
conscious organization such as the Jaycees. As the United States
Supreme Court has repeatedly held, however, an organization's
freedom of speech rights must not be limited by the repugnancy of
its views. Therefore, as long as free speech protection extends to
the KKK's expression of its radical beliefs, the freedom of
association, as an attendant right, should protect its membership
decisions consistent with its well-established views.
This discussion helps to illustrate that the freedom of
association should not protect the status-based discrimination
found in Roberts and Dale from state regulation, because no First
Amendment rights are implicated. Discrimination by a public
accommodation based on status, such as race, sex, or sexual
orientation should generally be deemed outside the scope of the
freedom of association or should be overcome by the state's
compelling interest in ending discrimination in such organizations.
The only limitation on this principle is where the individual's
status so contradicts the organization's fundamental views or
purpose that including the individual would in itself be expressive.
This position furthers the view that the scope of the freedom of
association is an attendant right to the First Amendment that
operates to protect free speech and assembly rights.
Most organizations with discriminatory membership policies
do not develop such policies to further the expressive purposes for
which their members associate. Instead, they are motivated by
the type of behind the scenes invidious discrimination that has for

180. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
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so many years permeated these organizations and allowed their
members to hide their prejudices from the public. Surely, this
unspoken prejudice is not an interest underlying the First
Amendment that warrants constitutional protection. If these
organizations want First Amendment protection, they should be
required to declare their prejudices publicly and face the scrutiny
and likely criticism that would follow.
Courts must carefully distinguish between those instances in
which an organization excludes an individual for expressive
purposes and those where the individual's status is the controlling
factor. Analysis of the categories discussed in subsection A, helps
to clarify the proper scope of an organization's freedom of
association so that the Court may more accurately determine
whether an individual's inclusion into the group will significantly
affect this freedom.
IV. How THE COURT SHOULD HAVE DECIDED BoY SCOUTS OF
AMERICA V. DALE: APPLICATION OF THE SPEECH-STATUS

DICHOTOMY.
The remainder of this article will apply the proposed
analytical framework to the facts before the Supreme Court in
Dale. Comparing the result under this analysis with the result
reached by the majority will help to show that the Court
broadened the freedom of association beyond the interests set forth
in the First Amendment.
New Jersey's Law Against
Discrimination was unnecessarily trumped as a result.
The question the Court should have asked first in Dale was
whether the Boy Scouts dismissed or excluded James Dale as a
result of his speech or because of his status. Examining the actual
reason for the exclusion and determining into which of the five
categories this conduct falls would have enabled the Court to
determine whether the individual's inclusion actually would have
infringed on the group's ability to convey its message. This, in
turn, will help the Court decide whether the freedom of association
should protect the activity from regulation.
The Boy Scouts' dismissal of Dale as an active member and
assistant scout leader can most accurately be categorized as a
hybrid case involving elements of both speech and status. In his
interview with the Star-Ledger, Dale made a public statement
identifying himself as a homosexual and the president of Rutgers
University Lesbian/Gay Alliance."8 ' The Boy Scouts maintained
that this brief statement formed the sole basis of its dismissal of
82
Dale."
It appears, however, that the Monmouth Council was
influenced to a greater extent by his status as a homosexual
181. Dale, 530 U.S. at 645.
182. Id. at 689.
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man.183 Therefore, it is necessary to examine these two factors
separately to determine whether the Boy Scouts' freedom of
association was implicated in its decision to dismiss Dale.
The first issue concerning Dale's comments in the interview
focuses on whether the comments were speech or status, and if
they were speech, whether they infringed on the Boy Scouts'
purported message on homosexuality. After attending a seminar
on gay issues, Dale gave the interview to an out of town
newspaper in which he identified himself as the homosexual copresident of Rutgers gay/lesbian organization."u
He told the
reporter that while growing up, he was searching for a gay role
model, and that today's gay teenagers need more gay role models
to look up to."S Just because Dale made these statements does not
necessarily qualify them as viewpoint speech for the purposes of
this analysis. It is important to decide whether these comments
actually expressed a message or viewpoint.
Justice Stevens forcefully argues in his dissent that none of
Dale's words printed in the Star-Ledger article communicate a
message or express a particular view on homosexuality. 86 Most of
what Dale said merely identified him as a homosexual man and
that cannot be considered expressive speech." 7 These particular
comments should therefore fall into the speech equals status
category and should not receive constitutional protection because
the Boy Scouts have not declared anti-homosexuality as one of its
fundamental beliefs. Excluding Dale based on his status as a
homosexual is not the type of membership decision protected by
the freedom of association."S
The Boy Scouts, however, argued that Dale's statement
expressing a need for more gay role models went beyond
identifying his status and expressed a viewpoint on
homosexuality. 9
It can be argued that even these comments,
which affirm the self-worth of homosexuals, should be considered
an extension of self-identification. 9 ' While this argument has
merit, it is difficult to see its limit. Certainly every comment
regarding homosexuality or other identity groups that positively
affirms its members may not be deemed non-speech. If any clear
distinction may be drawn, it is perhaps best drawn between
statements regarding one's individual identity as a member of a
status group and statements regarding the status group as a

183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Id. at 695 n.21 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 697.
Id. at 690.
Id.
Id.
See generally Dale, 530 U.S. at 663 (summarizing dissenting view).
Dale, 734 A.2d at 1207.
Hunter, supra note 8, at 28.

2003]

Freedom of Discrimination?

whole. While the former serves as a means of self-identification,
the latter goes beyond the individual and expresses a message
about the status group's intrinsic value. As a result, these later
statements are expressive and must be treated as viewpoint
speech that may "significantly infringe" the organization's ability
to express its view.'
The statement at issue in Dale arguably comes within the
gray area between these two types of statements.
Dale's
statements advocating more gay role models arose from his
comment that he did not personally have any such role models
growing up.
To this extent, his words may be seen as an
extension of his individual identity and therefore as non-viewpoint
speech. Admittedly, one can argue that the statement went
beyond Dale's own life and identity, and therefore should fall into
the later expressive type.
Treating these statements as viewpoint speech, however, does
not mean that Dale's membership substantially infringed on the
Boy Scouts' freedom of expressive association. Until this litigation
arose, the Scouts had no clear position on homosexuality, and any
position the organization did take was not released to either its
members or to the public.9
Even if one accepts the Boy Scouts'
argument that its position was clear, Dale's statement did not
advocate a homosexual lifestyle for others. Instead, he merely
advocated the need for more role models in the gay community.'94
This distinction is important, because while a statement urging
the need for more role models expresses a viewpoint, it does not
directly express a viewpoint on homosexuality. Therefore, these
statements cannot significantly infringe on the Scouts' ability to
express its view.
The statements Dale made in the newspaper article primarily
made the Boy Scouts aware of Dale's homosexuality, which
provided them the real impetus for removing him from the
Scouts. 9 It is a weak argument for the organization to contend
that it feared its members and their parents would read the article
and associate Dale and his comments with the Boy Scouts' views
on homosexuality. The Boy Scouts' real fear was that Dale's
homosexuality itself conveyed a message or that by being a
homosexual Dale would promote that lifestyle to the members."9
Dale was a Boy Scout member for twelve years, during which time
he earned the coveted Eagle Scout rank for his exemplary conduct

191. Dale, 530 U.S. at 659.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

Id. at 645.
Id. at 675-76 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 645.
Id. at 675-76.
Dale, 734 A.2d at 1229.

The John MarshallLaw Review

[37:125

and was entrusted as an assistant scoutmaster. 197 At no time
during this period did he express any views whatsoever on
homosexuality to any scout. The proper application of the freedom
of association is to protect the Scouts' right to dismiss him if and
when he actually advocates such views among the group or in the
immediate community. In fact, the organization's official position
is that scout leaders should avoid any discussion of sex.198 There is
no reason to believe that homosexual members would violate this
policy any more than heterosexual members would.
Nor can Dale's status as a homosexual be considered an
example of the status equals viewpoint speech category set forth in
section III. That category should be narrowly construed so as only
to apply to situations where a member of an identity group seeks
admission into an organization whose fundamental purpose is the
opposition of or hatred toward that group. In these cases, such as
those involving an African-American trying to join the Klan, the
very presence of the individual expresses a message that infringes
upon the organization's fundamental expressive purpose. Clearly,
the presence of homosexuals in the Boy Scouts communicates no
such message.
The Boy Scouts' vague message that its members should be of
good moral character never addressed homosexuality or sexuality
in any way."' The organization waited until it discovered Dale's
sexuality to either publicly or privately espouse any views on the
issue.
Since the Scouts developed this viewpoint after it
discovered that Dale was gay, the viewpoint cannot be considered
vital to the organization's fundamental purpose. It is extremely
dangerous to allow a group to express a very broad message and
then clarify that message through its individual membership
decisions.
Furthermore, as the Court has ruled in various contexts, the
organization could not ascribe certain viewpoints to Dale as a
result of his status."
This was the very principle the Court
adhered to in Roberts when it prevented the Jaycees from
excluding women from becoming voting members because the
group believed women would support different views than male
members.'
Therefore, the Boy Scouts' reason for revoking Dale's
membership rested largely with his status as a homosexual, and
not with his expression of a viewpoint contrary to its teachings.
As previously discussed, this type of status-based discrimination
197. Dale, 530 U.S. at 640, 665.
198. Id. at 669 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
199. Id. at 640.
200. See, e.g., Roberts, 468 U.S. at 627-28.
201. Id. (holding that unsupported generalizations about a group of people
are assumptions on which the court can not base legal decision making).
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does not implicate the important speech interests of the First
Amendment, and therefore, it should not receive the constitutional
protection under the freedom of association.
V. CONCLUSION

With greater awareness and social consciousness of the ills
presented by discrimination has come conflict between
organizations' freedom to choose their members and individuals'
rights to seek admission into these organizations without
consideration of their status. The issue presented in Boy Scouts of
America v. Dale illustrates this legal and social struggle and its
effects on both parties involved. The Supreme Court's decision in
this case failed to effectuate the proper scope of the freedom of
association or New Jersey's interest in limiting discrimination in
its public accommodations.
This article has offered a framework in which to analyze the
reasons a public accommodation excludes or removes a member
and whether those reasons "significantly infringe" on the
organization's freedom of association.
By first determining
whether the decision falls into a speech or status category, the
Court will be better able to answer this question and to determine
if the exclusion warrants constitutional protection.
Placing
greater emphasis on this inquiry also helps to ensure that the
proper scope of this freedom is applied, and that organizations will
not be allowed to invidiously discriminate against individuals
under the shield of the Constitution.

